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From Knowledge Dependence to Knowledge Creation: Industrial 
Growth 
and the Technological Advance of the Japanese Electronics Industry  
ABSTRACT  
The thrust of the argument put forward in this paper is that the postwar technological 
advance of the Japanese electronics industry was in essence a product not a primary 
cause of industrial growth. We demonstrate that the industry's surge forward resulted 
from the interaction of a unique combination of political, economic and cultural 
forces. Business leaders took full advantage by investing on a massive scale in 
physical, organizational, human and technological resources. It was success in the 
marketplace and strong cash flows that allowed Japanese firms to import technology 
on a large scale, invest in scientists and engineers, and progressively develop world 
class technological capabilities. In establishing themselves as global players, Japanese 
electronics firms moved over the years from a position of knowledge dependence to 
one of knowledge creation. We explore how this transformation was achieved and 
how they learned to control and exploit knowledge creating systems and processes. In 
particular, we establish the multi-faceted context and complex set of relationships that 
have conditioned strategic decision making and the creation of technological 
capabilities. 
From Knowledge Dependence to Knowledge Creation: Industrial 
Growth  
and the Technological Advance of the Japanese Electronics Industry 
 
INTRODUCTION  
The rise of the Japanese economy from the rubble of defeat in the Second World War 
may no longer be viewed as 'miraculous', but it remains a phenomenon that is 
imperfectly understood. Lewis, Fitzgerald and Harvey (1996, pp. 55-110) amongst 
others, have provided a convincing synthesis of the process of economic regeneration 
and development that resulted in an annual average compound rate of growth in real 
GDP between 1950 and 1992 of 6.7 per cent, a figure which dwarfs those for rival 
industrial economies such as Germany (4.3 per cent), France (3.8 per cent), the USA 
(3.3 per cent) and the UK (2.4 per cent) (Maddison, 1996, p. 32). On the supply side, 
Japan is seen to have benefited from a large, highly skilled and disciplined labour 
force that for long accepted relatively low wages in return for continuous 
employment. Equally, the Japanese demonstrated the importance of discipline and 
social restraint in preferring to save and invest rather than consume both at the 
individual and corporate levels (Sato, 1987). Relatively low wages and the desire to 
save and accumulate combined to provide the wherewithal for capital investment and 
output growth on an unprecedented scale. On the demand side, Japanese industry was 
well positioned to take advantage of the postwar liberalization of the international 
economy and the western boom in consumption. Meanwhile, the domestic market, 
while not closed to foreigners, was informally protected to the extent that the 
producers of both consumer and industrial goods could more or less guarantee to 
recover development costs on the basis of domestic sales alone. Such favourable 
supply and demand conditions were necessary to rapid industrial growth, but they 
were not in themselves sufficient. What crucially made for success was that Japanese 
firms had what was needed to take advantage of favourable circumstances. They 
invested heavily in plant and equipment to capture economies of scale and scope. 
They continuously refined methods of working to win productivity gains and improve 
product quality. They acquired and developed the technologies needed to introduce a 
stream of new products and manufacturing processes. And, finally, they created 
organizations with the flexibility to change and adapt to new circumstances and 
events, eventually moving beyond the shores of Japan to build international business 
empires.  
This explanation of Japanese economic success in the postwar era, while conforming 
to the available macro- and micro-economic evidence, does not tell the whole story. 
As Maddison (1995) has pointed out in a different context, it is important to 
distinguish between the proximate and ultimate causes of economic growth. 
Proximate causality refers to the inputs and techniques that directly bring about 
growth, whereas ultimate causality refers to the institutional, historical, cultural and 
policy factors that underlie the more immediate proximate causes. It is relatively easy 
to identify and quantify the impact of proximate causes of growth (the supply and 
demand side factors noted above, for example), but the ultimate causes of growth 
almost invariably remain more mysterious and less amenable to measurement. This is 
because when looking at the proximate we are mainly concerned with the hard and 
tangible outward expressions of a phenomenon, but when in search of ultimate 
causality we are more concerned to discover historical determinants, institutional 
relationships and cultural origins, which are altogether more elusive, harder to 
circumscribe and pin down. 
This article is concerned with one aspect of the search for a more complete 
understanding of the growth and development of the Japanese economy in the postwar 
period. The main topic is the creation of leading edge technological capabilities 
within the Japanese electronics industry, one of the pillars of the postwar economy 
and an industrial success story of the first order. From a position of chronic 
depression at the end of the Second World War, the industry entered into a period of 
sustained development that proceeded virtually unbroken before the entry of the 
Japanese economy into stagnation during the early 1990s. Year-on-year growth, at 
rates in excess of 10 per cent for most years between 1950 and 1990, saw Japanese 
firms rise to the fore in international markets. In 1990, the value of output of the 
Japanese electronics industry was a staggering $164,854 million compared to 
$154,625 million for Europe as a whole and $211,471 million for North America. 
Within the field of consumer electronics, Japanese firms had won a massive 
advantage, with sales valued at $30,570 million compared to $12,271 million and 
$6,382 million for Europe and North America respectively (EIAJ, 1993). 
In establishing themselves as global players, Japanese electronics firms moved over 
the years from a position of dependence on foreign technology to one of technological 
leadership. In this article we explore how this transformation was achieved and how 
Japanese electronics firms have learned to control and exploit knowledge creating 
systems and processes. We distinguish throughout between the proximate and 
ultimate sources of industrial growth. In particular, we seek to establish the multi-
faceted context and complex set of relationships that have conditioned strategic 
decision making and the creation of technological capabilities. We begin by analyzing 
the proximate causes of industrial growth and put forward a simple interpretive 
model. In section 3, the analysis is deepened through a discussion of the ultimate 
(historical, cultural and political) sources of industrial growth. This enables us in 
section 4 to contextualize and explain the movement from knowledge dependence to 
knowledge creation. We conclude in section 5 by analyzing the outcomes and 
implications of the growth and technological advance of the Japanese electronics 
industry since 1945. 
 
PROXIMATE CAUSES OF GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT  
In our view, the postwar growth and development of the Japanese electronics industry 
is best represented as the product of dynamic evolutionary forces, complexity and 
multi-causality matched by the existence over the years of a relatively small number 
of industry constants. On the one hand, complexity may be seen to have resulted from 
the interplay of macro and micro forces and domestic and international developments. 
On the other hand, the powerful upward trajectory of the industry over more than four 
decades, to become established at the forefront of the global industry, may be 
represented as the product of four mutually reinforcing forces, each of which has 
varied in intensity and importance from time to time. The four determinants of 
corporate and industrial performance and the manner of their interaction are presented 
in Figure 1.  
The model, while abstracting from reality, has the virtue of demonstrating that 
electronics enterprises and management teams existed in a particular historical 
context, which ipso facto conditioned strategic choices. It has the further advantage of 
providing a scheme for the classification of the main factors governing the long-term 
performance of the industry. In all, twelve main factors may be identified as key 
proximate causes of growth and development.  
   
Domestic Cost Factors 
• Japanese firms had the advantage down to the 1970s of relatively low wages 
and a low labour share of value added (Jaffar, 1998).1 This conferred the twin 
advantages of being able to manipulate prices competitively while yielding 
substantial retained earnings to fund large-scale investments. 
• From the early 1950s onwards, Japanese firms benefited from having a highly 
disciplined and committed workforce, reluctant to jeopardize firms' wellbeing 
through strike action or to restrict output and productivity growth (Price, 1997, 
270-73). The existence of a dedicated and responsive labour force allowed 
firms to take full advantage of innovations in methods and systems of 
production without conceding all the gains to labour in the form of higher 
wages and improved conditions of employment.  
• High rates of corporate and individual savings created a situation of abundant 
capital at low cost, which in turn facilitated the pursuit of economies of scale 
and scope through massive investments in production, research and 
development (R&D), and marketing (Denison and Chung, 1976). 
 
Domestic Market Factors  
• The domestic market for electronic goods benefited from a high-income 
elasticity of demand for its products when for several decades the rate of 
growth of Japan's GNP considerably exceeded that of its main rivals (Argy 
and Stein, 1997).  
• While the domestic markets for consumer and industrial electronics were 
buoyant, they were in part protected from foreign competition by the 
continuation of Japanese import restrictions. This meant that domestic prices 
could be kept high and that domestic sales alone could underwrite heavy 
investments in new product development, plant and equipment (Komiya and 
Itoh, 1988).  
 
International Economic Factors  
• The postwar international political settlement favoured Japan by giving ready 
access to overseas markets despite a lack of reciprocity. Hence the toleration 
displayed by western countries down to the 1980s of high and rising Japanese 
manufacturing trade surpluses (Steven, 1996).  
• The significant undervaluation of the yen against the dollar during the era of 
fixed exchange rates gave Japanese electronics a big competitive advantage in 
overseas markets, stimulating the pursuit of high export ratios and scale 
economies (Shinohara, 1982.) 
• Japan, before it was seen to be a major rival, was granted ready access to 
crucial western technologies (as well as management expertise) through 
licensing and other agreements. Without access to leading-edge technologies 
during the critical formative period of the modern electronics industry in the 
1950s and 1960s, the Japanese electronics industry could not have embarked 
on the expansionist international path that it took (Imai, 1992). 
 
Internal Firm Factors  
• Industry leaders pursued a logic-of-action similar to that identified by 
Chandler in Scale and Scope (1990), recognizing at an early stage the need to 
make massive investments in production, distribution and management in 
order to compete successfully in international markets. The internalization of 
this view by management led firms continuously to upgrade their knowledge 
base, systems, processes, human resources, capital stock and product range.  
• Control of key product and production technologies was seen at an early stage 
to be crucial to long-term success within the global electronics industry. 
Initially through licensing, but fairly soon thereafter through self-generated 
R&D, Japanese firms reaped the rewards of technological excellence 
(Harryson, 1998; Fruin, 1992; Fruin, 1997).  
• High quality standards and responsiveness to customer needs were established 
as core industrial values during the postwar reconstruction period. The belief 
that the customer always has new needs, and that it is necessary for firms 
proactively to identify and satisfy these, has led to numerous product 
innovations and the securing of economies of scope in production and 
distribution (McMillan, 1985). 
• Japanese managers within the electronics industry have responded with 
alacrity to fundamental shifts in competitive conditions. The massive transfer 
of production of consumer electronics from domestic to offshore locations is 
but one of numerous examples of a deep-seated understanding that individual 
firms must work with and not against the logic of the market (Fujino, 1998).  
 
The critical point to emerge from this taxonomy of the proximate sources of 
growth and development is that individual firms and business leaders were 
neither passive beneficiaries of uniquely favourable circumstances nor were 
they alone responsible for the success enjoyed by the Japanese electronics 
industry. What they must be credited with is discerning at critical moments 
what was required to take full advantage of new technologies and market 
opportunities and to act accordingly in making a long series of bold strategic 
investments. In practice, of course, it is not possible to isolate the impact of 
one factor or determinant from another, as the dashed lines in Figure 1 
indicate. The situation is more akin to that described by Porter in The 
Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990), wherein mutually reinforcing 
interactions generate the momentum to create globally competitive industry 
clusters.  
ULTIMATE CAUSES OF GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT  
Any search for the ultimate causes of corporate and industrial growth involves 
studying the motivation and behaviour of economic actors at the level of both the 
individual and the organization. Inevitably these are mediated at the societal level 
through more general economic, cultural and political processes. All events and 
outcomes are in this sense historically contingent. From this viewpoint, a business 
enterprise is conceived primarily as a community dedicated to the maintenance and 
development of a value creating system. The community is shaped and conditioned by 
environmental pressures and by the values and aspirations of its members, who in turn 
are influenced through their involvement with others in society. Corporate culture is 
defined as the shared values, beliefs and aspirations of members of the community, 
which find expression in the way they routinely behave and cooperate (or not) with 
others by way of formal and informal relationships (Lewis, Fitzgerald and Harvey, 
1996, pp. 1-54). The answers to ultimate questions, such as how and why business 
enterprises at a particular point in history form an enduring social settlement (the 
division of value added between capital and labour), can only be found through the 
analysis of historical, political and cultural processes.  
It is difficult now, more than half a century later, to comprehend the depth of despair 
felt in Japan at the dramatic conclusion of the Second World War. Hyperinflation, 
mass unemployment and occupation followed, and it was not until the early 1950s 
that the country could look forward once again to a brighter future (Tabb, 1995). The 
details of how the Japanese people came to terms with defeat and rebuilt their nation 
and its place in the international community are beyond the scope of this article. 
However, the argument presented here is fundamentally informed by our 
understanding of some of the most salient stylized facts of postwar Japanese history. 
Occupation and Economic Reconstruction  
In pursuing its twin political objectives of demilitarization and the establishment of 
democracy, the Occupation administration actively promoted the economic 
reconstruction of Japan between 1945 and 1952. Most conspicuously, steps were 
taken to reform the old zaibatsu and the managerial class was purged of industrial 
leaders stained by association with militarism (Morikawa, 1995). More importantly, it 
is accepted that economic expansion was needed to legitimize the new democratic 
pro-American political order. The electronics industry was a natural candidate for 
assistance through the agency of its Civil Communications Section, which promoted 
schemes for technical assistance and the introduction of modern management 
techniques under the banner of the quality movement. These initiatives had long 
lasting effects, anticipating the high profile work of management gurus like Deming, 
Juran and Drucker, and were consolidated between 1955 and 1962 through the work 
of the US technical assistance programme. Influential agencies such as the Electronics 
Industry Association of Japan (1948) and the Japan Productivity Center (1954) had 
their origins in American quality, productivity and technology initiatives (Nakamura, 
1995, pp. 150-55).  
Japan and the International Economic Order  
Japan suffered from a chronic balance of payments deficit for more that a decade after 
the end of the Second World War, notwithstanding the boost to exports resulting from 
the special procurements (tokuju) boom induced by the outbreak of the Korean war in 
June 1950. This was perceived in Washington as a fundamental threat to political and 
economic stability in Japan at a time when fear of communism was far from subsiding 
(Morishima, 1982, pp. 164-65). It is for this reason that the United States gave its 
blessing to the Foreign Exchange and Trade Control Law of 1949 and the Foreign 
Investments Law of 1950 that together provided a considerable degree of protection to 
nascent Japanese industries. Informal but effective protectionism was tolerated long 
after Japan had joined the IMF (International Monetary Fund) (1952) and had 
formally acceded to GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) (1955). Even 
when the Japanese balance of payments swung into massive surplus, the infant 
industries having grown up, the United States government continued to look benignly 
on the situation: the political gains from stability in Japan were seen to outweigh the 
economic costs (Kosai, 1986). Against the prevailing economic logic, the yen 
remained pegged at 360 to the dollar down to 1971, yielding a massive cost advantage 
to Japanese exporters.2 Only after the Plaza Accord of 1985 was the situation fully 
normalized (Belberdos, 1997).  
Reconciliation of Capital and Labour  
The history of labour relations in Japan in the first decade after the war is one of 
searing conflict followed by healing compromise. Labour was very much in the 
ascendancy during the crisis-torn hyperinflationary years (1945-49) when Japan's 
political future hung in the balance. Management sought to reclaim lost ground over 
the next few years, asserting its right to manage, and dismissing large numbers of 
workers following a series of calamitous strikes. The damage wrought by 
management-union antagonism served as a potent reminder of the costs of conflict, 
and as the economy stabilized in the early 1950s both employers associations and 
unions began to see virtue in a more conciliatory approach to wage bargaining (Price, 
1997; Gordon, 1988). The 'new deal' settlement, seen nowadays as a quintessential 
part of the Japanese system, was established during the 1950s as a consensus emerged 
that capital and labour should work together in pursuit of prosperity. Relative stability 
of employment was guaranteed in exchange for corporate loyalty and recognition of 
the efficacy of mutual consultation. By the mid-1950s, the old politicized unions had 
given way to newer enterprise unions that stressed the unity of purpose binding the 
firm. There were two main consequences. First, the share of value added (sales minus 
purchases) distributed to labour in wages and salaries was much lower in Japan than 
in competitor nations. Correspondingly, a relatively high proportion of earnings was 
available for investment. Second, the 'new deal' social settlement prioritized long-term 
growth over short-term profit maximization in order to keep the workforce in 
continuous employment (Sugayama, 1995).  
Corporate Governance and Business-State Relations  
Before the Second World War, a lack of adequate market mechanisms caused firms in 
many sectors to internalize activities within conglomerate structures. At the heart of 
several zaibatsu was a large bank, while associated general trading companies, the 
sogoshosha, provided access to raw material and overseas markets. The zaibatsu were 
formally disbanded after 1945 as part of the demilitarization process, but the 
economic logic of cooperative alliances encouraged the same groups to re-coalesce as 
the kigyo shudan (enterprise groups). Mutual shareholdings created a fresh network of 
supportive strategic alliances, and company groups continued to facilitate investment 
and the flow of market intelligence in the reconstruction period and beyond (Suzuki, 
1991). The ability of large corporations, the kaisha, to attract the support of banks, 
business allies and government facilitated rapid industrialization in postwar Japan 
(Abegglen and Stalk, 1985). Government, through the agency of the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) and other bodies, was able to exert strategic 
influence through a process of administrative guidance (gyosei shido), striking a 
balance between cooperation and competition (Fruin, 1992). The system served to 
highlight and define strategic issues and to target resources in a flexible and effective 
manner (Tidd, Bessant and Pavitt, 1997, pp. 85-87). This was a classic response to the 
problem of relative economic backwardness and the struggle to catch up with more 
advanced competitor nations. As the economy developed and companies upgraded 
their organizational capabilities, so they became progressively less in need of support 
from the banks and state agencies (McMillan, 1995; Johnson, 1982; Aoki, 1997; 
Scher, 1997; Johnstone; 1999; Lazonick, 1999).  
Economies of Scale and Scope  
In Scale and Scope, the classic study of the dynamics of industrial capitalism, 
Chandler (1990) makes the case that enterprises grow large and prosper when they 
remain focused and committed to the exploitation of economies of scale and scope. 
According to this view, large-scale investments are often needed in order to capture 
fully economies of scale in production, distribution and marketing, and to recoup 
R&D costs. Firms that exploit opportunities to win a significant market share through 
driving down unit prices while maintaining product quality secure sustainable first-
mover advantages. These arise through reputation effects and because profits flow 
thick and fast for those that move first to capture scale economies. High profits mean 
that first-movers can reinvest heavily to keep ahead of the competition and diversify 
harmoniously to capture economies of scope (spreading R&D costs yet more thinly). 
Such firms enter a virtuous circle in which each sizeable new investment in physical, 
human and intellectual resources builds organizational capabilities and in turn the 
cash needed to sustain corporate growth and development. In confirming the 
applicability of the Chandler model to postwar Japan, Morikawa has demonstrated 
how the managerial elite that rose to prominence after 1945 pursued this logic-of-
action and gave immediate priority to capital investment and building organizational 
capabilities rather than short-term profit maximization. Investments in plant, 
equipment and distribution were made on an unprecedented scale. A virtuous circle 
ensued: 'increasing equipment investment led to market expansion, which generated 
new business opportunities, stimulated competition for market share, and encouraged 
further equipment expansion' (Morikawa, 1997, p. 321).  
These stylized facts embrace many of the ultimate causes Japanese economic growth 
in the postwar period. Our list is not exhaustive nor is our account complete. But what 
we can say with confidence is that industrial success on the scale achieved was the 
product of a unique combination of historical circumstances. The Occupation 
administration strove for economic regeneration as a means of achieving political 
goals, and by the same token Japan was granted an advantageous position in the 
international economic order. High rates of corporate and personal savings, promoted 
by a social settlement between capital and labour that favoured accumulation over 
consumption, provided the means by which industrialists could take advantage of 
favourable domestic and international market conditions. The prevailing system of 
corporate governance, reinforced by supportive government agencies, encouraged a 
coordinated and strategically astute approach to corporate and industrial growth. 
Japan's new managerial class had a strong predilection for growth, investing heavily 
to secure economies of scale and scope, to win commanding market shares, and 
ultimately to build formidable organizational capabilities (Odagiri, 1992). 
Each of these forces was at play in creating the technologically sophisticated Japanese 
electronics industry of today. Companies such as Hitachi, Mitsubishi Electrical, NCR 
Japan, NEC, Nippon Columbia, Pioneer, Sharp, SMK, Stanley Electric, Tamura, 
TDK, Matsushita and Toshiba survived the tribulations of the Second World War, but 
the transition from war to peace was initially a slow and demanding process. 
However, some bright spots did emerge at an early stage encouraged by government 
and the Occupation administration. By the late 1940s, for example, there were some 
200 companies contesting radio receiver production. Indeed, radio manufacturing had 
almost regained its 1941 wartime peak by 1948, and production levels escalated from 
287,000 sets in 1950 to 10.2 million sets in 1959. The record of monochrome TV 
production tells a similar story of year-on-year growth with the number of sets 
produced rising from just 14,384 in 1953 to 2,872,209 in 1959. From virtually a 
standing start in 1945-46, the industry was producing goods to the value of Y391.5m 
by 1960 and already 16 per cent of sales were made abroad (Bureau of Statistics, 
1948-60). 
It was after 1960, however, that the Japanese industry mounted a serious challenge to 
its American and European rivals in international markets. Output and exports forged 
ahead once firms had achieved mastery of solid-state technologies (Kimura, 1984). 
The figures presented in Tables 1 and 2 paint a remarkable picture. These suggest that 
the years between 1960 and 1995 may be divided into three periods. First, the period 
of super-fast growth between 1960 and the slowdown induced by the oil crisis of 
1973. It is conspicuous that for electronics manufacturers at least, the oil crisis bit 
harder in domestic markets than it did internationally. Continued strong export growth 
buoyed up the industry such that growth rates remained positive even during the 
darkest of times. Thus during the second period, from 1973 to 1985, high rates of 
growth in output were underpinned by the industry's strong performance in export 
markets. There is an evident change in pattern during the third period, the decade 
following the Plaza Accord of 1985 that was marked by the phenomenon of yen 
appreciation. As the yen climbed steeply in value against the US dollar, Japanese 
electronic products became steadily less competitive in export markets and there was 
a commensurate downward pressure on profit margins. Manufacturers responded by 
shipping production offshore to the low-wage developing economies of South East 
Asia and mainland China. Hence the sharp downturn in growth rates for output and 
exports, especially after 1990 when economic stagnation at home marked the end of 
the golden era of the Japanese electronics industry.  
  
TABLE 1: Output and exports of the domestic Japanese electronics industry, 1960-95 
(1990=100) 
Year Output Exports 
 Current Prices 1990 Prices
Current 
Prices 1990 Prices 
1960 1.6 1.2 0.6 0.4 
1965 2.7 2.2 1.9 1.6 
1970 12.2 10.3 7.2 6.1 
1975 18.1 13.0 15.5 11.2 
1980 36.1 26.3 38.5 28.1 
1985 77.5 60.3 88.2 68.6 
1990 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1995 94.1 116.0 105.5 130.1 
 
Sources: Computed from annual volumes of Bureau of Statistics, Japan Statistical 
Yearbook,  
and annual volumes of Ministry of International Trade and Industry Foreign Trade of 
Japan.  
  
TABLE 2: Average annual percentage rates of growth of Japanese electronics 
domestic output and exports, 1960-95 
Year Output Exports 
 Current Prices 1990 Prices
Current 
Prices 1990 Prices 
1960-
65 10.6 15.5 26.2 29.3 
1965-
70 35.2 35.6 31.1 31.4 
1970-
75 8.3 4.8 16.6 12.8 
1975-
80 14.8 15.1 20.0 20.3 
1980-
85 16.5 18.1 18.0 19.6 
1985-
90 5.2 10.6 2.5 7.8 
1990-
95 -1.2 3.0 1.1 5.4 
 
Sources: Computed from annual volumes of Bureau of Statistics, Japan Statistical 
Yearbook,  
and annual volumes of Ministry of International Trade and Industry Foreign Trade of 
Japan.  
   
FROM KNOWLEDGE DEPENDENCE TO KNOWLEDGE CREATION 
The powerful upward movement in production and exports recorded by the Japanese 
electronics industry over successive decades may give the impression of a simple yet 
compelling logic at work. But nothing could be further from the truth. Sustained 
growth over a long period was, in this instance, more the manifestation of effective 
structural change and adaptability than the persistent exploitation on a global scale of 
a limited number of markets. In fact, the industry displayed a remarkable capacity to 
re-invent itself in the face of cost and market imperatives. There have been profound 
changes in the balance of production within the domestic industry. In 1960, the 
industry was primarily identified with the production of consumer goods such as 
radios and televisions; by 1995 the situation was almost completely transformed. The 
long-term thrust recorded in Table 3 has been to foster the production of high value-
added industrial equipment and electronic components. Meanwhile, the assembly of 
consumer products has been moved to lower wage economies offshore, especially 
after 1985 (Jaffar, 1998). Hence the sudden surge in components as a proportion of 
exports after that date.  
TABLE 3: Sectoral shares of domestic output and exports of the Japanese electronics 
industry, 1960-95 (percentages) 
Year Output Exports 
 Consumer IndustrialComponents Consumer Industrial Components 
1960 57 11 32 na na na 
1965 51 22 27 na na na 
1970 49 28 23 na na na 
1975 36 38 26 51 25 24 
1980 34 35 31 48 20 32 
1985 26 41 33 39 30 31 
1990 18 47 35 24 31 35 
1995 11 47 42 11 26 63 
Sources: Computed from annual volumes of Bureau of Statistics, Japan Statistical 
Yearbook,  
and annual volumes of Ministry of International Trade and Industry Foreign Trade of 
Japan.  
Fundamental to the process of long-term structural change within the industry was the 
increasing mastery of Japanese firms of relevant technologies and scientific 
knowledge, without which it would have been impossible to progress from a position 
of knowledge dependency to one of knowledge creation. The ability to acquire, 
control, utilize and commodify technological knowledge became assimilated over 
time as one of the core competencies of individual firms and the industry as a whole. 
This development has been depicted elsewhere as a series of distinct stages. Westney 
(1994), for example, identifies the 1950s and 1960s with technology imports, the 
1970s with improvements in production technologies and quality, and the 1980s with 
domestically generated technologies and basic research. In our view, any such view is 
fundamentally flawed and misleading: both the nature of the process at work and the 
available empirical evidence defy such ready classification. At the level of the 
industry as a whole, the transformation process was progressive and more akin to 
continuous improvement than a series of staged paradigm shifts. 
This view is implicit in the 'mountain climbing' metaphor of the technological 
advance of the Japanese electronics industry put forward by Makoto Kikuchi (1989), 
one-time Managing Director of Sony's corporate research centre. A modified and 
updated Kikuchi 'model' is presented in Figure 2. 
 The 'model', though highly subjective, is useful in drawing attention to a number of 
important points. First, the US electronics industry throughout the postwar period 
served as the technological exemplar for Japan: it is in the US that standards 
traditionally have been set and key technologies developed, refined and 
commercialized, establishing the benchmarks against which Japanese firms have 
measured their success in closing the 'technology gap' (Oshima, 1987). Second, both 
the US and the Japanese industries have lived through a protracted period of 
technological development, distinguished by intensive organizational learning and the 
creation of fresh technological capabilities ('climbing the mountain')(Odagiri and 
Goto, 1996). Third, for a long period, down to the mid-1980s and the triumph of very 
large scale integration (VLSI), the Japanese industry was on balance playing 'catch-
up' with the American industry. Fourth, the process of technological change, 
involving as it has done very large numbers of products and processes, in aggregate 
has been incremental rather than involving sudden shifts or movements. The pattern is 
one of progressively rising technological complexity, interdependence and 
sophistication (Kodama, 1991). Fifth, Japanese firms have moved forward from a low 
base more rapidly than their US rivals, taking the lead in many fields (liquid crystal 
displays, flash memories and professional broadcasting equipment, for example), to 
achieve an overall position of technological leadership within the non-military world 
industry. 
The ultimate causes of the technological advance of the postwar Japanese electronics 
industry, moving from knowledge dependence to knowledge creation, are intimately 
bound up with the business history of modern Japan. Modern economic growth began 
following the Meiji restoration in 1868 and the exposure of the country to foreign 
ideas and influences. Mechanisms were developed, in part unique to Japan, which 
compensated for the lack of efficient markets and widespread manufacturing know-
how. The state and its allies in business drove forward a modernizing agenda that in 
the 1930s became distorted by militarisation and imperial ambitions. 
Notwithstanding, managerial and technological skills were accumulated and these 
were deployed to the full in the service of the military during the Second World War 
(Okazaki, 1994). Japan's economic heroes, like their military colleagues, were 
humbled by defeat. Between 1945 and 1947 the Occupation administration actively 
remodeled business enterprises, government and university departments along civilian 
lines, terminating all activities that might serve military ends (Nakayama, 1991). 
Numerous engineers and scientists joined the ranks of the unemployed. 
Yet, whatever the immediate problems of adjusting from war to peace, Japan, like 
Germany, emerged from the war with a worthy industrial legacy in the form of 
established 'high technology' companies, business managers and engineering talent 
(Fransman, 1990, p. 13).3 The main economic problems faced by Japan in 1945 were 
macroeconomic, political and structural, not corporate per se, although there were 
serious adverse consequences for business resulting from inflation, low levels of 
effective demand and a strident labour movement. Once these problems were 
resolved, however, Japanese electronics firms were well placed to confront the 
problem of relative technological backwardness that had existed before the war but 
which had been exacerbated by it. Furthermore, after 1947 and the issue of the 
Truman doctrine, the US government turned from foe to friend in actively promoting 
the transfer of technology and manufacturing know-how from the US to Japan 
(Hayashi, 1990). Military applications of American technology may have been 
banned, but this only served to concentrate resources and speed the rate of effective 
technology transfer. 
Technology transfer was one element of a national strategy for the industrial recovery 
of Japan. Relative economic backwardness and a lack of natural resources suggested 
export-oriented industrialization as the natural development path. If the country was 
to pursue this course successfully Japanese goods had to compete in international 
markets on the basis of both price and quality. This in turn required the importation of 
western technology and manufacturing know-how. The problem that confronted the 
Occupation administration and the government was how to pay for technology and 
capital equipment imports at a time when Japanese manufactures were uncompetitive 
in international markets. 
The solution lay in the adoption of a distinctly nationalistic and quasi-protectionist set 
of economic policies and administrative procedures (Nester, 1991; Shin, 1996). In this 
way, domestic markets were protected from competition, and the foreign exchange 
released for technology and capital imports was targeted at improving the productivity 
and productive potential of industries with good export potential. The two main 
legislative instruments regulating technology imports were the Foreign Exchange and 
Foreign Trade Control Law (FEFTCL) of 1949 and the Foreign Investments Law of 
1950. Under these laws, technology agreements were only 'validated' once signed off 
to the satisfaction of the Bank of Japan, the Ministry of Finance, MITI and the 
Science and Technology Agency (Kosai, 1986, p.55). The guiding principle according 
to a team of British businessmen visiting Japan in 1962 was that agreements should 
contribute to 'the self-support and sound development of the Japanese economy' and 
'the improvement of the international balance of payments.' The system allowed MITI 
to achieve a high degree of administrative coordination in trying and testing 
technologies before approving their adoption on an industry-wide basis. In a typical 
year during the 1950s more than 100 agreements were signed granting access to 
foreign technology and patents in exchange for royalty payments of approximately 3 
per cent for technology, 5 per cent for patents and 7 per cent for technology plus 
patents. By 1961 the cost of technology imports had risen to $111 million (EPA, 
1962, p. 59). 
Japanese electronic firms, staffed by experienced engineers and scientists, had the 
absorptive capacity to make the most of foreign technology imported at what would 
prove to be bargain prices. Sony, for instance, gained access to transistor technology 
in 1953 through its patent contract with Western Electric, and by 1957 had launched 
the world's first transistor radio. It proved a resounding success in both the domestic 
and export markets. The Japanese had recognized the strategic importance of 
transistorized solid state technology and by 1960 the vacuum tube was effectively 
obsolete (Odagiri and Goto, 1996). What made the transistor revolution particularly 
significant was that it gave manufacturers the opportunity to miniaturize components 
and end products, saving on both energy and materials. By the late 1960s, the basic 
transistor itself had been superseded by the more advanced integrated circuit, which 
led to major savings through process simplification reduced power consumption. The 
new industrial field of semiconductor manufacturing was thereby brought into being 
in Japan. A remarkable amount of technological knowledge flowed into the country 
during the 1950s and 1960s, representing a striking example of both tacit and explicit 
knowledge conversions on an industry-wide scale (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995).  
Integral to the process of technological absorption was the introduction and 
refinement of new manufacturing methods. As with fundamental technologies, 
however, the majority of these methods originated in the US. It was in the 1940s and 
early 1950s that Japanese electronics firms made their commitment to quality as a 
guiding principle. The lead was taken by the Civil Communications Section (CCS) of 
the Occupation administration, whose course on modern management methods ran for 
the first time for two six-week periods in 1949 and 1950.4 The course stressed the 
importance of engaging employees in the planning process and aligning their 
aspirations with long-run organizational goals. A key message was that the customer 
should define quality, while a lack of commitment to quality equated to an indifferent 
corporate strategy. Particular emphasis was placed on the role of middle managers as 
change agents, especially technologists and engineers who were encouraged to aspire 
to senior managerial positions. The graduates of the pioneering CCS course were 
active in later years in spreading the influential techniques and messages of American 
management gurus like Deming, Juran and Drucker. A further important source of 
ideas was the American technical assistance programme to Japan that ran between 
1955 and 1962 at a cost of $12 million. The programme took 3,568 individuals in 345 
teams from Japan to study business methods in the US. More than 100 American 
management consultants and engineers crossed the Pacific to spread the gospel of 
productivity and quality within large Japanese firms. At the same time, the Japan 
Productivity Council was formed to disseminate information on modern management 
methods throughout Japanese industry. Tiratsoo (2000) argues that the technical 
assistance programme, though long overlooked in the management literature, had a 
profound impact 'in relation to specific techniques and processes, especially those 
intrinsic to the discipline of industrial engineering … at the very heart of efficient 
manufacturing.'  
The fusion of technological and manufacturing expertise that resulted from 
(politically inspired) initiatives taken during the reconstruction era had emerged by 
the 1960s as a defining feature of the Japanese electronics industry. It made possible 
the rapid commercial deployment of technologies by reducing the lead-time between 
R&D and the launch of products with mass market potential (Fruin, 1995). Radios, 
monochrome televisions and colour televisions in turn became hit products at home 
and abroad, and the dawning of the television age swiftly suggested other 
possibilities. Initially, broadcasting studios were largely American-equipped, but by 
1954 Ikegami Tsushinki (1992) had signed technical agreements with RCA and EMI, 
and within four years was producing its own transmission equipment. This was 
followed during the 1960s, again using US technology, acquired through 
collaboration with Ampex, by fully transistorized professional broadcasting 
equipment (VTRs). Within two years of the sale of the first two VTRs in Japan, both 
Sony and Toshiba had constructed their own prototypes, to be followed by similar 
versions from other manufacturers. The experience gained in this way, combined with 
the mastery of miniaturization, is fundamental to any explanation of Japan's command 
of the world VTR market by the end of the 1970s (Harryson, 1998, pp. 126-49).  
Mastery of the art of conceiving and manufacturing high quality products at low cost 
that appealed to consumers and industrial customers in markets across the world 
triggered the virtuous circle of growth that saw the Japanese electronics industry go 
from strength to strength down to the 1990s. Market domination yielded strong cash 
flows, and because employees and shareholders were modest in their demands, there 
were exceptional amounts of free cash available for investment. This was targeted at 
product development, the acquisition and discovery of technological knowledge, 
investment in new plant and equipment, manufacturing and marketing systems 
development, and raising the productivity of employees through education and 
training. Multiple advantages accrued: notably, higher productivity, reduced unit 
costs, improved quality, more attractive and higher performing products, and short 
development times. All this worked to consolidate the position of Japanese firms 
within existing markets and to cultivate and command fresh markets. The sheer 
dynamic force of the process made for high and sustained rates of industrial growth 
(Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997). Meanwhile, the prospective threats to the system 
that loomed large from time to time did not materialize. Nations disillusioned by 
Japanese trading practices felt unable to retaliate or were assuaged when Japanese 
firms made sizeable direct investments in the US and Europe (Belberdos, 1997; 
Kimura, 1994). Employees remained compliant and kept faith with a system that 
delivered security and steadily rising incomes. Shareholders had little to reason to 
complain about low dividends when the value of their holdings seemed to move 
forever upwards. Only with the bursting of the bubble economy in 1990 was the 
Japanese system of corporate governance seriously called into question (Lazonick, 
1999; Dore, 1997; Bostock and Stoney, 1997). 
The possession of a regular and lavish supply of investment funds enabled Japanese 
electronics firms progressively to enhance their technological capabilities (Vestal, 
1993). This was done in two distinct but complementary ways. The first was to invest 
in people and the development of an innovation-minded corporate community. At the 
heart of this community were university-educated engineers and scientists. In the 
1940s and 1950s these people were in short supply, and in 1959 Japanese electronics 
firms had only half the number per thousand employees as their US rivals (31 
compared to 60) (Freeman, 1987, p. 10). Engineers and scientists were a scarce 
resource and this fact had an important conditioning effect on national, corporate and 
functional business strategies. At the national level, the knowledge sharing initiatives 
supported and guided by MITI were intended to get the most out of a relatively small 
engineering and scientific workforce. At the corporate level, every effort was made to 
lure individuals away from universities and other competing employers through the 
provision of excellent facilities and conditions of employment. Companies offered 
continuous employment, good rewards and high professional status, and opportunities 
for personal development at home and in the US as inducements to join their 'family' 
(Itoh, 1994). At the functional level, engineers and scientists had of necessity to be 
'spread' across the organization, moving periodically between central laboratories and 
divisions, between R&D and production, and between specific projects and regular 
operations. They also had need to relate closely to shop-floor workers and to draw 
upon them for ideas and support (Schroeder and Robinson, 1993). Flexibility and 
cooperative working were thus born out of necessity. 
In our view, three of the defining elements of the Japanese approach to technology 
acquisition and management were in origin a product of relative economic 
backwardness. When the electronics industry began to power upward towards the end 
of the 1950s and when large amounts of free cash became available, familiar norms, 
standards and methods of working had already been established throughout the 
electronics industry. These are manifest in what Lazonick and West define as 
'organizational integration' (Lazonick and West, 1998). Japanese capitalism is 
portrayed by them as 'collective', characterized by highly relational communities that 
extend beyond the boundaries of individual firms, universities or public bodies. Under 
these social arrangements 'know-who' is as important as 'know-how' and innovation is 
frequently the product of multi-disciplinary project teams. R&D and manufacturing 
are linked through the collective knowledge of engineers and scientists and a common 
sense of organizational purpose. Ideas are drawn from multiple sources from within 
and outside firms and they are developed collectively through the vehicle of the 
project team (Imai and Clark, 1994). Stability and continuity result from the fact that 
senior technologists remain with the same firm rather that moving periodically to 
advance their careers as in the US. All this continues to apply even though the initial 
problem of a lack of graduate engineers and scientists has long since disappeared. 
Already by the end of the 1970s the number of people graduating from university with 
first and higher degrees in electrical and electronic engineering was higher in Japan 
than in the United States (21,435 against 16,093 in 1979) (Freeman, 1987, p.47). 
Moreover, with 80 per cent of R&D concentrated in private firms and directed at 
civilian ends, Japanese electronics enterprises had moved from a position of critical 
human resource scarcity to one of abundance (Freeman, 1987, p. 11). 
The second means of enhancing technological capabilities was through the creation 
and regular enhancement of R&D facilities, systems and routines. Okimoto and Nishi 
(1994) have provided a stylized description of the pyramidal research infrastructure of 
the large integrated semiconductor manufacturers, and the same description might be 
applied to the integrated electronics majors. A Central Research Laboratory (CRL) 
forms the apex, Divisional Laboratories (DLs) occupy the middle levels, and a 
multiplicity of Factory Engineering Laboratories (FELs) forms the baseline. The 
CRL, operating on a five to ten year timescale, is responsible for nurturing and 
expanding the fundamental and theoretical technological knowledge of the firm. The 
DLs are engaged in product development. Interactions with the CRL are two-way: at 
times they respond to product ideas pushed downwards, at other times they 
commission fundamental research. The FELs take responsibility for the 
implementation and refinement of manufacturing processes working in close 
conjunction with relevant DLs and on occasion with central manufacturing process 
teams. The pyramidal model had its origins in American industry and dates back to 
the early 1900s. Japanese firms from the late 1950s emulated it: many of the largest 
CRLs of today (Sony, for example) date from the early 1960s (Nakayama, 1991, pp. 
97-102). 
In moving from knowledge dependence to knowledge creation, it is not structures and 
systems per se that have served the Japanese electronics industry so well: it is the way 
in which they have functioned at a human level and have constantly adapted to 
environmental changes and competitive pressures (Fransman, 1995). The case of 
Sharp is illustrative.5 In 1970, Sharp began to develop a new CRL, its Advanced 
Development and Planning Centre, on a 55-acre greenfield site. The complex took ten 
years to complete at a cost of Y7.5bn, a sum equivalent to 70 per cent of the 
company's capitalisation in 1980. The Sharp CRL consists of numerous fundamental 
R&D groups. Research is commissioned by DLs responsible for product 
development. Primacy rests at the DL level because it is the divisions that are best 
placed to anticipate customer requirements. A Production Technology Group is 
responsible for ensuring on an interactive call and response basis the transfer of 
technology between corporate R&D and manufacturing. Research and engineering 
personnel work across the system and are often conscripted to project teams to 
research a new technology or develop a new product or solve a manufacturing 
problem. The unifying strategic idea is that of the base technology. Starting from a 
single base technology (or core component) as many commercial applications as 
possible are developed (this is known as the 'spiral system'). For example, on the basis 
of its command of liquid crystal technology Sharp has 'spiraled out' numerous devices 
in the fields of home appliances, electronic advertisements, AV equipment, games 
consoles, medical electronics, industrial sensors, automotive devices, computer 
screens and many others.  
Many Japanese electronics firms have followed a similar path to that of Sharp (Fruin, 
1997; Collinson and Molina, 1995; Harryson, 1998). The overall thrust has been to 
evolve, step-by-step from the disjointed and resource deficient organizations of the 
1950s to the highly integrated and well-resourced organizations of today (Sigurdson, 
1995). In the immediate postwar decade, Japanese firms lacked the know-how and 
systems needed to bring homegrown inventions like the Esaki diode (1957) to 
commercial fruition. But this situation did not last long. By the 1960s, many firms had 
the capacity to absorb and make the most of imported technologies. As the industry 
boomed, the demand for technology from overseas grew rather than receded as the 
absorptive capacity of firms increased. At the same time, Japanese firms began to 
invest heavily in more fundamental research, creating an indigenous capability to 
generate and exploit original ideas. This was signaled by a steep rise in patents issued 
to Japanese inventors at home and abroad (from 8.9 to 17.9 per cent of all US patents 
issued between 1975 and 1985) (Freeman,1987, p.21). By the early 1980s it was 
evident that in non-military electronics Japan had virtually closed the technology gap 
with the US. The Japanese triumph in VLSI, which saw its manufacturers claim 48 
per cent of the world semiconductor market in 1987 (compared to 39 per cent for the 
US), marked a watershed (Forester, 1993, p. 45). Thereafter it was no longer possible 
simply to dismiss Japanese firms as technological followers riding on the back of 
pioneering US corporations: the one-time follower had plainly emerged as a 
technological leader. 
CONCLUSION: INTERPRETATION, OUTCOMES AND IMPLICATIONS  
The thrust of the argument put forward in this article is that the technological advance 
of the Japanese electronics industry (1945-95) was in essence a product not a primary 
cause of industrial growth. We have demonstrated that the industry's surge forward 
resulted from the interaction of a unique combination of political, economic and 
cultural forces. Business leaders took full advantage by investing on a massive scale 
in physical, organizational, human and technological resources. It was success in the 
marketplace and strong cash flows that allowed Japanese firms to import technology 
on a large scale, invest in scientists and engineers, and progressively develop world 
class technological capabilities. This is not to say that technological progress was not 
essential to industrial growth. Plainly it was. But the movement from knowledge 
dependence to knowledge creation ultimately followed in the wake of business 
expansion: technology, down to the 1980s, was a lagging rather than a leading 
variable in a dynamic process of systemic growth.  
Interpretation Three related theoretical ideas are helpful to a general understanding of 
the postwar growth and technological advance of the Japanese electronics industry. 
The first is that of relative economic backwardness. According to Gerschenkron 
(1962), a moderately backward industrializing nation such as Japan in the late 1940s 
and 1950s would, with strategic guidance from the state and big business, focus its 
efforts on modernization in a limited number of industries. In such countries, market 
mechanisms are imperfect and the resources needed for development are in short 
supply; hence the drive to concentrate resources and the concomitant internalization 
of market functions by firms. Corporate and industrial leaders in effect find 
substitutes for mechanisms and resources that are more readily available in advanced 
economies. In the case of Japanese electronics, one of the main prerequisites for 
growth was the acquisition, absorption and deployment of western technologies. The 
main constraints were financial and human. Industry-wide sharing of (costly) 
knowledge through MITI and trade associations, the concentration of (scarce) 
engineering and scientific talent in private sector enterprises and rotational methods of 
deploying technologists, may be seen as strategic responses to the exigencies of 
moderate economic backwardness.  
The important point is that economic backwardness fundamentally conditioned the 
development of the Japanese electronics industry. In terms of our second theoretical 
idea, its pattern of growth was path dependent: heavily influenced by systems, 
routines and norms established at an early stage (Mueller, 1997). Administrative 
coordination through MITI and trade associations proved to be efficacious in the 
diffusion of technology and management techniques. Likewise, the concentration of 
R&D in private sector firms soon became structurally embedded. Meanwhile, at the 
operational level, many of the working practices that were born of necessity, such as 
the rotation of technologists and the extensive use of project teams, were culturally 
and systemically assimilated. History casts a long shadow.  
We argue that the movement from knowledge dependence to knowledge creation was 
gradual, and resist the idea of staged paradigmatic shifts. The construct that best 
embraces our view of the change process is Lazonick and West's organizational 
integration hypothesis (Lazonick and West, 1998), the third of our key theoretical 
ideas. In the Gerschenkron model, economic backwardness is equated with 
variability, disjointedness and a lack of integration at the corporate, industrial and 
national levels. These were certainly features of the Japanese electronics industry 
immediately after the war. The trajectory was towards the integration of structures, 
systems and processes in the quest for higher levels of organizational effectiveness 
and efficiency. Integration extended beyond individual firms backward to suppliers 
and forward to customers. Conventional distinctions between R&D and 
manufacturing became blurred (Imai and Clark, 1994). Thus, while path dependency 
may impose constraints, it simultaneously embraces beneficial tendencies. In Japan, 
the tendency was towards organizational integration and the creation of deep-seated 
organizational and technological capabilities. Japanese electronics firms were thereby 
able to progress more rapidly than their American rivals, eventually emerging at the 
forefront of the non-military world electronics industry. 
Outcomes and Implications  
Fransman, in analyzing the characteristics of the Japanese 'technology-creating 
system', draws attention, as we have done, to the importance of history in fashioning 
its development. In his view, the crucial role played by MITI and state-funded 
laboratories was in reducing levels of uncertainty in private firms with regard to 
investment in R&D. By identifying and part-funding future-oriented research 
programmes, especially in industrial electronics, creative partnerships were formed 
and leading-edge technological knowledge disseminated throughout the industry. 
Economies of scale and scope in R&D were secured in the process. In this way, the 
state was able to lend strategic direction to the industry without destroying the 
benefits of competition between firms in various application domains. The industry 
was thus able to move successfully, as the technology gap between the US and Japan 
was closed, from the development of 'technology for tomorrow' to the creation of 
'technology for the day after tomorrow.'  
This aspect of the transition from knowledge dependence to knowledge creation is 
consistent with the thesis presented in this article. Japanese firms, when confronted by 
the problems resulting from economic backwardness, needed support and direction 
from the state in order to compensate for the high incidence of 'market failure'. The 
internalization of activities and routines was a second consequence, contributing to 
the creation of a distinctive system of corporate governance. Electronics enterprises 
became highly vertically integrated and affiliated in family groups. The dominant 
firms at the hub of the Japanese industry were resistant to voluntary collaboration in 
R&D because, as Fransman points out (1990, pp. 266-76), the transaction costs of 
policing agreements were too high. Only with state aid could transaction costs be 
reduced to an acceptable level. When seen in this light, the technological history of 
the Japanese electronics industry is Janus-faced: at once a united national endeavour 
and a struggle between individual firms for the control of key technologies. 
What is true today was just as true in the immediate postwar years. The corporate 
struggle focused then on the race to acquire foreign technology, with MITI and other 
government agencies mediating in pursuit of the collective good. Long after Japanese 
firms had begun to make independent technological advances, they continued to 
import far more technology than they exported.6 But the persistence of a negative 
balance of trade in technology, far from being a sign of continued backwardness, was 
a reflection of a deliberate strategy: the big players in the industry sought to extract 
the best technology they could from the rest of the world while limiting access to that 
which was 'made in Japan'. This is entirely consistent with the policy of 'internalize 
and control' that has long been a defining feature of the industry. The current 
technology policies of Japanese firms bear testimony to the enduring nature of this 
characteristic logic-of-action (Ordover, 1991; Okada and Asaba, 1997). Within Japan, 
electronics firms occupied second, third, fourth, fifth, seventh and ninth positions in 
the national R&D expenditure league table in 1996. Outside Japan, they have become 
senior partners in numerous global R&D networks, embracing private sector firms 
and top research universities (Cairncross, 1994; Turner, Ray and Hayward, 1997). 
There is nothing fanciful about such collaborations: the aim, as ever, is to gain control 
over scientific and engineering knowledge that can be integrated within the 
technology-creating systems of Japanese firms (Teramoto, Richter, Iwasaki, Takai 
and Wakuta, 1994). What is certain is that Japan has learned the lesson of its own 
history: its intellectual property will never be so freely dissipated as that of the US 
when it was the undisputed leader of world electronics industry. 
Notes 
1. A recent study of the financial structures of Japanese electronic and computer 
manufacturers estimates labour's share of valued added at 44% in 1983 compared to 
57% ten years later. Comparable figures are not available for earlier years, but it is 
nonetheless plain that well before the mid-1980s Japanese electronics manufacturers 
had very large amounts of cash available for reinvestment. (Jaffar, 1998). 
2. On 15 August 1971, after repeated efforts to persuade Japan seriously to 
contemplate policies aimed at reducing a worsening US balance of payments 
situation, President Nixon unilaterally announced a temporary surcharge of 10% on 
imports. Under the terms of the subsequent Smithsonian Agreement of 18 December 
1971, the surcharge was scrapped and a realignment of the major exchange rate 
parities was inaugurated, in effect paving the way for an era of floating currencies.  
3. A point made by Fransman (1990, p. 13): 'The rapidity with which transistor and 
computer technologies were acquired from the United States and Europe and 
reproduced in Japan was largely a function of the substantial capabilities that had 
been built up in the country since the 1920s … Although the technological 
capabilities of these industries still lagged behind those of the world's leaders by the 
1950s, enough had been learned to facilitate a fast and successful assimilation of the 
cluster of new technologies that heralded the arrival of the information age.'  
4. In researching the activities of the CCS, we had the benefit of an extended 
interview with one of its leading lights, Homer Sarasohn, conducted in London by 
Tony Hayward on 13 December 1995. Matsushita reprinted the CCS course textbook 
in 1995 under the title Management Manual. Further reflections on the CCS and the 
origins of the quality movement in Japan derive from Y. Kondo, 'The Japanese 
Experience of Quality in the Last Half Century,' presentation in London 13 December 
1995. Professor Kondo is a winner of the Deming Prize and since 1970 he has been a 
council member of the Union of Japanese Scientists and Engineers (more familiarly 
known as JUSE). 
5. Tony Hayward compiled the case study material on Sharp. This consists of in-house 
documents on technology development and management, field notes and interview 
transcripts. Interviews were held with R & D personnel at the Tenri and Makuhari 
research facilities in May 1997. A further interview was conducted in Oxford with Dr 
Clive Bradley, then managing director of Sharp Laboratories Europe, in November 
1996.  
6. Interestingly, although Japan's overall technology trade (import and export of 
patents, designs, technology transfers, trademarks and software licenses) with the rest 
of the world was broadly in balance by 1990, the balance of trade with the US is still 
overwhelmingly in America's favour, which is significant as the US accounts for 
about 30% of Japan's technology exports and 70% of imports. In 1996, the deficit 
with the US stood at Y120bn. It ought, however, to be noted that the gap has been 
closing significantly during the 1990s. (Agency of Industrial Science and Technology, 
1998, 48-57).  
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